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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
THE CACM NATIONS, PANAMA AND BELIZE: PROS-
PECTS AND BARRIERS TO TRADE WITH THE
UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
Michael W., Gordon*
THE CACM NATIONS AND PANAMA - BACKGROUND
The five original CACM nations' and Panama are a separate and
identifiable part of the larger heterogenous Caribbean Basin area. This
sphere of nations also has significant diversities, although it is assuredly
a more homogenous area than the Caribbean Basin as a whole. Within
the CACM and Panama there are political, cultural and economic
variances which directly and indirectly affect both intraregional trade
and trading relationships with foreign areas, including other Caribbean
Basin nations.
There are diverse government structures within the CACM and in
Panama. Costa Rica has established what is probably the most stable
democracy of all Latin American nations. 2 The absence of the military as
a dominant force in Costa Rica is the most significant distinction
between Costa Rica and the four other CACM countries plus Panama.3 In
each of those nations the military not only persists as a significant
absorbent of national revenues, but as the dominant political force. Each
of those five nations exists under a form of military leadership. Three of
them - Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua - have a leader who was
in some form "elected" to office. While the military leadership in these
four CACM countries is extremely conservative, the government in
Panama is identified more with the liberal socialism of several of the
Caribbean island nations.
One might expect that among the four CACM nations with
conservative military governments there would be strong regional ties.
* Professor, University of Florida School of Law.
1. The original CACM nations were Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras,
Nicaragua and El Salvador. In discussing the CACM as a Caribbean Basin sub-
region, one must include El Salvador even though, while having no Caribbean
coastline, it is not a Caribbean Basin nation. It is nonetheless affected by the
Caribbean position of each of its CACM partners. But, in considering the CACM
as part of the Caribbean Basin, one must recognize that the direct interest of El
Salvador is tempered by its location, and it is unlikely individually to be a
participant in Caribbean activities such as the above discussed multinational
shipping enterprise.
2. C. DENTON, PATTERNS OF COSTA RICAN POLITICS (1971); B. ENGLISH,
LIBERACI6N NACIONAL IN COSTA RICA (1971).
3. F. PARKER, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS (1964). See generally T.
KALIJARVI, CENTRAL AMERICA: LAND OF LORDS AND LIZARDS (1962).
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One does see traces of such support - for example, the Honduran,
Salvadoran and Nicaraguan support for Guatemala's position with
respect to Belize. There has nonetheless been no recent cohesive political
alliance among the CACM nations, and indeed the relations between El
Salvador and Honduras have reached varying degrees of hostility during
the past decade.
Although each of the CACM nations and Panama have similar
cultural origins, there are significant economic distinctions. Each of the
six nations is considered among the developing nations of the world.
Nevertheless they cannot be discussed in the same framework as other
developing nations of the Western hemisphere such as Mexico, Venezuela,
Argentina or Brazil. I would refer to the CACM nations and Panama as
dependent rather than developing, since they do not possess either very
large populations or, much more importantly, vast quantities of known
and producing natural resources. 4 They are thus dependent, not only on
their traditional trading relationships with the developed nations of the
world - principally the United States - but also on the comparatively
new relationships with the large developing nations of the hemisphere.
Furthermore, the CACM nations are indirectly affected by the relation-
ships between the traditional developed nations and those larger
developing nations. While one should consider the five CACM nations
and Panama as each being a dependent nation, the developmental
experiences of the six nations have greatly varied. 5
THE IDEA OF AN INTEGRATED CARIBBEAN BASIN MARKET
Rather than approaching the Caribbean Basin as a homogeneous
entity with a prospect of considering what may be utopian ideas of a
Caribbean Basin integrated market, it appears more appropriate to seek
to identify area commonalities, and to develop bilateral, or preferably,
multilateral relationships among the countries. This may result in more
rapid economic growth, thus diminishing the tendency of each country to
seek nationalistic goals which can impede development. We can
consequently benefit by exploring the appropriateness of new multina-
4. See Gordon, Developed, Developing and Dependent Nations: Central
American Development in a New Economic Realignment, 2 J. OF INT'L L. & ECON.
1 (1976); reprinted in 10 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA
DE PUERTO Rico 235 (1976).
5. One of the critical issues to the reformation of a viable CACM is the
recognition that Honduras needs special attention to its less developed stature
among the CACM countries. The inability to resolve this issue during the original
formation of the Market was one of the causes of the breach a decade later and its
resolution is critical to a new market structure.
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tional corporate developments among nations with common natural
resources, such as bauxite in Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana and possibly
Costa Rica; or the benefits to a possible Western hemispheric oil
consortium with Venezuela, Mexico and possibly Guatemala, if time
erodes the successes of OPEC; as well as a further development of
production and marketing arrangements for common agricultural
products. It is undoubtedly in the last area where significant alterations
could be achieved, but where there are additionally difficult internal and
external obstacles. Caribbean economic relationships clearly will develop
most fully where there are common political views. It is thus likely that
successful economic alliances will be achieved among those nations
which possess, or which do not strongly object to, identifiable and
compatible political ideologies. The ability of Costa Rica to work within
the framework of conservative military governments of other Central
American nations is an absolute prerequisite to the full restoration of the
CACM. Such Caribbean Basin nations as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana and Belize have compatible ideologies and may seek economic
relationships. It is important to note that with respect to the Central
American isthmus, variant political ideologies exist at the most northern
and southern extremities, in Belize and Panama respectively, and that
the more likely political affiliation of Belize with a nation such as
Jamaica constitutes one of the most acute concerns of Guatemala. The
government is fearful that a socialist, sometimes perceived as communist,
nation, with a common border, might soon be established in Central
America, a threat to Guatemala's politically conservative government. 6
The political heterogeneity of the Caribbean Basin cannot be overlooked
as having a marked effect on current and foreseeable trading relation-
ships. Such heterogeneity is a fragmenting element which will preclude
any massive and successful economic association, and which suggests a
direction towards gerrymandered political affiances upon which economic
alliances may be constructed.
While the prospect of some economic associations may be precluded
by political heterogeneity, there are some economic associations which
should be able to function to the benefit of Basin nations even within a
political heterogenous framework. The Caribbean Multinational Shipping
Company (NAMUCAR) is an example. Organized in May 1975, by three
Central American (Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama), two South
American (Colombia and Venezuela), two Caribbean (Cuba and Jamaica)
6. C. GARciA BAVER, LA CONTROVERSIA SOBRE EL TERRITORIO DE BELICE
(1958); N. DoBSON, A HISTORY OF BELIZE (1973).
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nations, and Mexico, the initial three years of operation has resulted in
substantial success, despite significant variant political ideologies.
7
THE CACM AS A SUB-REGION OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
AREA: THE ROLE OF PANAMA AND BELIZE
Another question is the role of Panama vis-a-vis the CACM nations.
Why, for example, is Panama not a party to the CACM? Geographically
isolated from South America in the sense of land transportation, Panama
has a more practical identity with the Central American countries. It is a
small nation which has been dependent upon a primary agricultural
product - bananas - as a substantial source of its foreign exchange.
Many foreign enterprises include Panama in the Central American
market area, particularly those based in the adjacent nations of Central
America. There are nonetheless differences between the nations. Panama
is historically oriented to South American settlements and much of it was
initially a part of Colombia. Its current military government is
ideologically opposed to the four nations of the CACM with military
governments, and there has been some hostility between the governments
of Panama and Guatemala over the issue of Belize. While Panama does
receive a significant source of its income from primary products, and will
undoubtedly realize increased revenues from the proposed copper mining,
it has quite a different business role than the CACM nations. Panama is
a major banking and administrative center for corporations doing
business in Latin America, a development attributable to the Panama
Canal. The canal association was one of the principal reasons that
Panama was not seriously considered as an initial participant in the
CACM. Panama was perceived to be relatively dependent upon the
United States, so that some alteration of that relationship was deemed
necessary before Panama would acquire sufficient independent status to
be a viable participant in the proposed market. With the Inter-American
highway providing excellent land transportation to Panama from the
CACM nations, and possessing both Pacific and Atlantic port facilities,
Panama could become an effective member of a restructured CACM. Its
dependent status strongly suggests the need for participation in an
economically integrated area. Nonetheless the ideological differences
mentioned above may preclude Panama's involvement in a restructured
CACM even after the new canal relationship is implemented.
7. See Comercio Exterior (Mexico) June 1975, at 185; July 1975, at 230; Feb.
1976, at 73; April 1976, at 158; August 1976, at 310.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
The resolution of the Belize territorial question appears possessed of
the same indeterminate time delay as with the resolution of the
"temporary" dissolution of the CACM.s The Belize issue is a divisive
matter among several of the Caribbean nations, and must not be viewed
as solely important to Guatemala and Belize. The desire for independence
on the part of the vast majority of those persons living in what is
generally accepted internationally as the boundaries of Belize finds much
support among the newer independent nations of the Caribbean;
Guatemala's position that Belize is a part of Guatemalan territory
receives somewhat tentative support from its CACM partners (a support
which grows weaker at the southern extreme of the CACM, in Costa Rica,
and is a disputed point with Panama). The Belize issue may be one of the
more overlooked trade-retarding matters if part of our purpose is to
identify and resolve trade restraints in the Caribbean Basin.
CACM TRADE
External Trade
A large share of the exports of the CACM nations, Panama and
Belize is destined for the United States. Within the CACM nations, the
United States in 1975 received thirty-nine percent of Costa Rica's exports,
thirty-eight percent from El Salvador, twenty-nine percent of Guatema-
la's, fifty-five percent of Honduras' and twenty-eight percent of Nicara-
gua's exports. Sixty percent of the exports of Panama and fifty-three
percent of the exports of Belize were sent to the United States.9
In 1977, the CACM in the aggregate achieved a favorable trade
balance with the United States. It is perhaps more accurate to say that
the United States experienced a deficit with that area. The individual
nation balances were as follows: Costa Rica - -$28 million; El Salvador
- +$175 million; Guatemala - + $17 million; Honduras - +$37 million
and Nicaragua - -$40 million, resulting in a net balance in favor of the
CACM region of $161 million.'" The country with the most serious trade
deficit - Nicaragua - has, as one would expect, the lowest proportion of
exports to the United States. Panama's balance of trade is decidedly in
favor of the United States, amounting to -$199 million, and thus more
8. See supra note 5.
9. Caribbean Basin Economic Survey, August-Sept. 1977, at 9, citing U.S.
Department of Commerce statistics.
10. The references for figures can be obtained from the Department of
Commerce.
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than offsetting the favorable trade balance of the CACM nations if
Panama were to be included in the single region. Belize additionally has
an unfavorable trade balance with the United States to the extent of-$11
million."
One cannot accept the above figures as suggesting a trend towards
continued favorable balances for the CACM nations, or an imbalance for
Panama. There has been a commodity trade improvement in Central
America which has significantly assisted the Central American countries
in their recovery from the higher costs of imported oil in 1973. The
abovementioned 1977 trade figures were substantially affected by the
impact of the then-escalating coffee prices. The effect of higher coffee
prices on the CACM countries' GDP illustrates the continuing signifi-
cance of coffee exports for that region.12 The importance of coffee will be
discussed further below.
There has been a considerable effort on the part of the CACM nations
to diversify their export trade. Nontraditional exports have been
emphasized in Costa Rica and Guatemala, and those two nations have
also successfully encouraged increased tourism. Costa Rica's nontradi-
tional exports were expected to amount to approximately seven percent of
the GDP in 1977, maintaining approximately a fifteen percent increase
for several years. 13 Nontraditional exports in Guatemala - primarily
fruit, vegetables, fresh flowers, furniture and artisan products - account
for nearly as much as tourism, each contributing approximately three
percent to the GDP. Although in El Salvador the contribution to GDP by
the export of nontraditional products has been low, it is expected to
increase significantly in the next few years, since that country has
directed its efforts to the establishment of export-oriented assembly
industries.
There are significant contrasts in the trade of the various CACM
countries, illustrated by the experiences of Costa Rica and Guatemala.
Costa Rica has traditionally had a trade imbalance, although 1976 trade
reduced to $110 million the 1975 trade deficit of $205 million. 4 The
reduction was principally due to high prices for coffee, a significant
volume of banana exports and an increase in the nontraditional export
sector. Costa Rica's persistent imbalances have resulted in occasional
11. See supra note 9.
12. For 1976, Guatemala's coffee earnings equaled approximately ten percent
of the GDP; for El Salvador they were twenty-five percent; Honduras-ten percent;
Costa Rica-twelve percent; and five percent in Nicaragua.
13. See supra note 9, at 62.
14. Id.
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unilateral actions which have caused disturbances in the functioning of
the CACM to be discussed below.
Guatemala, in contrast to Costa Rica, currently is the growth leader
in the CACM. It indeed has much to be positive about, with the first
delivery this year of nickel from the Exmibal project on Lake Izabal and
from the production of oil. Guatemala is the only Central American
nation with petroleum production, and the Exmibal project is one of only
two significant mining activities in the isthmus. The other is the copper
project in Panama, a government joint venture with Texasgulf not yet in
the production stage.15 In addition to its own oil production, Guatemala is
vigorously pursuing the construction of hydroelectric facilities. Combined
with a budgetary constious government, Guatemala's future appears
extremely sound. This nevertheless presents an interesting question as to
the nature of the future relationships between Guatemala and the other
Central American nations. If Guatemala achieves a significantly higher
growth than its neighbors, principally due to its newly found oil and
mineral wealth, to what extent will it share the fruits of its success with
the Central American region? The successful operation of a regional
market requires concessions by the wealthier members. Many observers
have reason to doubt that Guatemala, or any of the other Central
American nations, would be any more interested in wealth sharing
among the region, than they have been individually in adjusting grossly
inequitable national income distributions.
Intraregional trade
Intraregional CACM trade has significant imbalances, and indeed,
the trade balances of the various nations have not changed significantly
since 1968, although the quantity of trade in dollars has approximately
doubled. For example, Costa Rica had an $11.1 million trade deficit in
1974.16 In contrast, Guatemala's $34.4 million favorable trade balance in
1968 increased to $46.5 million in 1974. Honduras' trade deficit of $17.4
million in 1968, a significant cause of the breach of the market that year,
has decreased only slightly to a $15.5 million deficit in 1974. The most
significant imbalance is that of Nicaragua, increasing from a deficit of
$19.3 million to $45.2 million between 1968 and 1974. Only in Honduras
has the volume of trade decreased, from $31.3 million to $26.4 million. The
15. Alcoa long discussed the development of bauxite reserves in Costa Rica,
but ultimately withdrew from its development contract, thus ending, at least
temporarily, the prospect of what could have been significant export earnings for
that nation.
16. Integraci6n en Citras, SIECA.
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increases in each of the other four countries have been significant: in
Costa Rica - $31.7 to $100.4 million; El Salvador - $84.9 to $142.5
million; Guatemala - $77.5 to $170.2 million and Nicaragua - $26.9 to
$85.5 million, a total CACM regional increase of $258.3 million to $525
million. A positive aspect of this trade development is that manufacturing
represents an increasing share of the regional exports, accounting for
fifty-three percent of total intraregional exports in contrast to forty-eight
percent in 1968. This represents an increase in the dollar amount of
manufactured goods of 123%. Although the statistics are impressive, they
would be even more favorable were the CACM to be restored as a
functioning five member market.
THE COLLAPSE AND POTENTIAL RESURRECTION OF THE CACM
Trade relationships which involve the five Central American nations,
generally referred to as the CACM nations, must be considered in light of
the fact that there is no common market in Central America, nor has one
ever really existed. The General Treaty on Central American Economic
Integration, executed in 1958 but not finally ratified by Costa Rica until
1963, brought the organization close to a customs union, but never
achieved such additional integration activities as a free flow of workers or
a common monetary union, both criteria of a common market.
17
Nevertheless, as a customs union, the area has achieved very positive
success, stimulating much intraregional trade and achieving a favorable
balance in trade creation compared with trade diversion activities. The
withdrawal of Honduras in 1969 was caused by a combination of factors,
including disenchantment with its nonfavored status as an economically
less devejiped - member, but more particularly with the patterns of
migration of Salvadoran workers to Honduras. This resulted in the
termination of the five member customs union, and a continuation of a
fragmented four member customs union without the participation of
Honduras. Honduras subsequently entered into separate bilateral
agreements with Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala, actions which
significantly reduced the urgency for the restoration of the market. In
effect, the result was a termination of trading relationships between
Honduras and El Salvador, but otherwise a continuation of the pursuit of
intraregional trading relationships.
Since the withdrawal of Honduras, there have been numerable
attempts at market restoration. These negotiations have been conducted
17. Central American Integration documents are contained in 2 INSTRUMENTS
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 365-368
(1975).
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amidst a "business-as-usual" atmosphere, i.e., with nationalistic preferen-
ces. This is illustrated by actions such as Costa Rica's halt of payments
for regional imports in 1972 in order to correct a serious but self-induced
trade imbalance. In 1973 the Permanent Secretariat of the Central
American Common Market (SIECA) completed a major study of
development within the CACM and made recommendations for improve-
ments.18 Many of these were economically sound, including prior
approval of new foreign investment, the registration of transfer of
technology contracts and restrictions of local credit. The changes were so
significant, nevertheless, that it was unlikely that approval of the
changes and a resolution of the Honduras-El Salvador dispute could be
concurrently achieved. For the past five years there have been numerous
meetings by representatives of the five nations with a goal of restoring
economic integration, but the successes have been notably less than even
the prolonged but exotically located Law of the Sea Conference. A
significant disadvantage of the delay in restructuring the market has
been an increasing institutionalization of the idea of separate and
nationalistic development. The discovery of oil and development of nickel
mining in Guatemala, with the consequent potential for a greater degree
of self-sufficiency, may have reduced the motivation for Guatemala to
view the restoration of the market as an urgent matter. While these
economic developments place Guatemala in a position to be able to grant
concessions to Honduras, the least developed member, it also reduces the
dependency of Guatemala on the regional area, increases its ability to
sustain political nationalism, and thus indirectly perpetuates fruitless
negotiations for market restoration.
In 1975 the five CACM nations adopted the La Flora Declaration
which affirmed the need to restructure the CACM. The High Level
Commission of the CACM was instructed to prepare a new treaty, giving
consideration to less developed members. The draft of that treaty, the
"Treaty Creating the Central American Economic and Social Commu-
nity," has now been under study for approximately two years.'9 It
proposes a social and economic community, an integration well beyond a
customs union, eliminating all barriers to free movement of people, goods
and capital, and requiring coordinated policies in such areas as
agriculture, energy, finance and taxation. It is an important document,
not in its prospects for adoption in the near future, but in its
18. El desarrollo integralo de Centroamerica en la presente decade; bases y
propuestras para el perfeccionamiento y la restructuraci6n del Mercado Comun
Centroamericano (SIECA Feb. 1973).
19. Proyecto de Tratado de la Comunidad Economica y Social Centroameri-
cana (SIECA Marzo 1976).
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representation of the prevailing attitude within the CACM nations
toward their relationships with foreign investors and as a good indicator
of appropriate plans for development of the region over the next two
decades. But there appears to be no feeling of urgency for its adoption.
There is an insufficient feeling of a community of interests among the
CACM nations to accept the harmonization policy called for by the draft
treaty. For instance, in the light of its earlier dispute with El Salvador,
Honduras will not accept the free movement of labor in any new treaty.
Elections for government offices are held at different intervals in the
CACM nations, creating an overall frequency of elections and consequent
disinterest in discussing concessions required by the proposed treaty
during an electoral campaign. Other attention-diverting issues have
reduced the stimulation of market resurrection and will continue to do so
until resolved. These include an emphasis on domestic self-sufficiency in
agricultural production, the paradoxical world of the banana industry,
the extreme fluctuation of coffee prices, the development of petroleum in
Guatemala and the energy import needs of the other nations. For
Panama and Belize, resolution of the canal and territorial issues,
respectively, are important topics.
Although SIECA and AID have formulated a plan for cooperative
agricultural development among CACM members, there is substantial
evidence that these nations have increasingly stressed domestic self-
sufficiency. This has resulted in a serious misallocation of economic
resources.
There has been a significant alteration in the structure of the
banana industry in Central America. Originally dominated (nearly
exclusively) by the United Fruit (now United Brands) Company, three
large, multinational corporations currently share the production and
processing with numerous small independent enterprises. 20 In addition to
United Brands, Del Monte and Standard Fruit (Castle and Cooke) have
penetrated the market. While United Brands has reduced its dominance
in the banana industry ini Central America, it continues as one of the
dominant enterprises and, notwithstanding its corporate name change,
many of the wrongdoings, real and imagined, charged to it in the past
have not been forgotten. The company is perceived by many critics as
continuing to possess too extensive a role in the economies of several
Central American nations. Many viewers of the banana industry in
Central America believed that a more positive exercise of corporate
20. OAS, The Banana Industry, Sectoral Study of Transnational Enterprises
in Latin America (1975). See generally S. MAY and G. PLAZA, THE UNITED FRUIT
COMPANY IN LATIN AMERICA (1958); T. MCCANN, AN AMERICAN COMPANY (1976).
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responsibility by United Brands in its operations in Central America was
developing. This view was shattered, however, with the discovery of
payments by United Brands to various Honduran officials in 1975, the
result of which was the removal of the Honduran president from office.
21
The Union of Banana Producing Countries cannot function as a product
union with the economic power of the OPEC. Without the participation of
such a major producer as Ecuador, whatever modest power the
organization might possess Is significantly reduced. A more successful
direction would appear to be the conversion of this important sector to
local private ownership with the development of regionally-owned
multinational marketing facilities.
Unlike the banana industry, coffee in Central America is not
dominated by any large foreign interests. It is in the hands of many local
private owners. Although there has been some cohesiveness among
Central American coffee producers, their collective goals have both been
eroded by occasional actions by individual nations and by an unrealistic
conception of what their collective power can achieve. Coffee reached
$3.35 per pound between July 1975 and April 1977. By October 1977, it
was selling for $1.90 per pound with March 1978 futures at $1.46 per
pound. In March, the price was $1.72 per pound and the Central
American nations met to discuss methods to increase the price. A drought
in Central America or, more importantly, vicissitudes in Brazil will
undoubtedly lead to higher prices more effectively than any agreement to
withhold coffee from the market, a practice without any previous success.
Their actions have been directed to establishing a high price floor (but no
price ceiling) rather than to effectively regulate and allocate production,
or to develop viable multinational marketing organizations.22 Bananas
and coffee have been principal export products of the Central American
countries for many decades. The more recent attempt to form product
unions throughout the Third World, encouraged by OPEC's success, has
diverted the attention, and to a degree, the interest of many nations in the
restoration of geographical unions. Although multinational associations
in the coffee and banana producing areas could have a positive impact, it
is nevertheless unlikely that a cartel of banana or coffee producing
nations could exert the leverage of OPEC.
21. See, e.g., Comercio Exterior (Mexico) June 1975, at 208; Miami Herald,
April 19, 1975, at 3-B, col. 1; Wall St. J., May 19, 1975, at 5, col. 3.
22. One must consequently question whether a transfer of control of banana
production in Central American countries from the foreign enterprises to local
productions would be any more economically beneficial to the Central American
nations, if the banana producers proved to be as unrealistic in their viewpoint as to
collective power as have been the coffee producers.
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With the development of petroleum deposits in Guatemala, and the
lack of known petroleum resources in the other Central American nations,
the future role of Guatemala vis-a-vis the other nations is uncertain.
Current petroleum reserves in Guatemala suggest only a sufficient
quantity to provide some relief to Guatemalan oil imports, but not to
make it a Central American Kuwait. Participation in OPEC can be no
more than a hoped-for fantasy, but if the combination of petroleum
production and hydroelectric power permits Guatemala to achieve energy
self-sufficiency, it would appear to give Guatemala either a very
dominant role in a restructured CACM, or a reduced interest in any
restoration of the market if it must grant concessions.
The two nations of the isthmus which do not participate in the CACM
- Panama and Belize - are each engaged in an attempted resolution of
critical international issues which have had a significant effect upon
their abilities to fully devote their resources to economic development.
Implementation of the new treaties with the United States will allow
Panama to concentrate on economic resources, particularly the canal
which is the most significant economic resource in the entire CACM area.
Panama will be able to further develop its already important role as a
banking center, and additionally consider possible participation in a
regionally-integrated area.
The territorial issue of Belize appears far from resolved and indeed
the continuation of the status quo may be what is most desired by
Guatemala. The Belize issue has been raised in every recent election and
is perceived by many observers as a way of diverting public attention
from a severe misallocation of resources to the benefit of a small elite.
Fearful of the establishment of a socialist government in Belize, along the
lines of the comparatively nearby Manley government in Jamaica, many
Guatemalan officials would prefer to keep the territorial issue in a
continued state of negotiation, which will require the British to maintain
security forces in Belize and undoubtedly discourage the development of a
radical government which might create friction with England. There
have been recent announcements of some agreement between Guatemala
and England to resolve the issue, with Guatemala relinquishing its
claims to Belize in exchange for part of what is currently generally
accepted as the southern territory of Belize. Responses from the
government in Belize, however, have illustrated adamant opposition to
relinquishing any of its perceived territory, thus suggesting a continua-
tion of negotitations for the indefinite future. Although Britian's role in
Belize is limited to security and foreign policy, and the country is
technically free to adopt its own economic policies, the country has an
obvious attention-diverting issue which precludes it from truly focusing
on economic development issues - the British presence and the threat
from Guatemala.
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FUTURE NATIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
The future of the nations of the Central American isthmus has both
encouraging and foreboding elements. Each is a small, dependent nation
affected directly by relationships with the developed nations, with the
larger developing nations and, indirectly, by the relationships between
the developed and developing nations. While modest measures of
economic development may be achieved individually, prospects for
achieving significant development lie in some group association. The
association framework is already established for the original five CACM
nations, a framework which would appear to be the most natural
economic union for the association of Panama. It is unlikely that Belize
would seek association with a Central American union, since its political
and socioeconomic structures are more identifiable with other Caribbean
Basin nations. I have noted above, however, that multinational
association, exemplified by the attempts at the restoration of the CACM,
has proven to be an exceptionally slow process subordinated to individual
national development. Consequently some comments on the prospects for
individual countries appears appropriate and will help to provide a basis
on which to predict future regional economic associations.
Guatemala
The discovery of oil and the initial production of nickel offers
Guatemala a basis for economic growth absent in the other Central
American nations. The principal question will be whether the country will
effectively manage growth. The prospects seem most promising, clouded
by a moderately fragile political structure which has been unable to
resolve social unrest and has, in consequence, brought the country to a
level of persistent violence unparalleled in other Central American
nations. Guatemala has rebounded exceptionally well from the devastat-
ing earthquake of 1976. The nation has continued to concentrate on the
improvement of its infrastructure and the creation of new energy sources,
including hydroelectric and geothermal power. A country of exceptional
physical beauty, it has capitalized on this aspect by extensive, currently
overbuilt, tourist facilities. The withdrawal of the United Fruit Company,
through the sale of its Guatemalan banana operations to Del Monte, has
removed a source of friction for the government, although critics of large,
foreign investments have focused their attention on the nickel operation,
Exmibal. With that operation functioning as a joint venture in which the
Guatemalan government will obtain a thirty percent interest, the
argument of foreign domination has diminished. It appears quite likely
that the pattern for large, extractive-oriented projects in Guatemala, as
well as in other countries in Central America, will increasingly follow the
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pattern of larger Western hemispheric developing nations, requiring such
foreign enterprises to be joint ventures with domestic national or private
capital participation. While these nations neither individually nor
collectively have significant leverage, or the local capital to extract the
kind of domestic ownership limitations as dictated by Mexican law, very
large foreign investments are unlikely to be permitted to be established
and function with the freedom from local participation and control which
existed in the past. The joint ventures in Guatemala - for example, the
Exmibal nickel project, the pipeline to connect the oil fields with the
Caribbean and the copper project in Panama - are illustrative of a
continued and future format of negotiated joint ventures for foreign
investments.
A concern one must have in viewing the future for Guatemala is the
extent to which it will use its newly found wealth to pursue policies which
it perceives are in the best interests of Guatemala but which provide no
direct assistance for Central America as a region. In Guatemala, as in
other Central American nations, there is clear and strong reluctance on
the part of the elite to relinquish their power and material comforts. If
that pattern is evident in international economic relationships, Guate-
mala will not suffer in its economic growth as significantly as other areas
of Central America. In a restored CACM, Guatemala has the potential for
an important leadership role, but there have been sufficient expressions
of nationalism to suggest that it may neither wish to effectively carry out
this leadership role, nor be capable of doing so if such was to be a
government intention.
Honduras
The economic future of Honduras is dependent substantially on a
successful restoration of the CACM and the receipt of favorable treatment
for its least developed position among these nations. During the decade
when the market was functioning, Honduras was generally considered by
foreign investors to be one of the two least attractive locations for
locating a manufacturing facility. Honduras does not have an extensive
an Indian population as Guatemala, although it has encountered
persistent difficulties with farmers who have been unsuccessfully seeking
land reforms. Banana production has been substantially restored
following the devastating hurricane Fifi in 1974, but there has yet to be a
full resolution of the relationship of foreign banana companies to the
Honduran economy. The payment of over $1 million by the United
Brands Company to high government officials, possibly including the
President, caused both a severe disruption in government functions and
illustrated the continuing dominance of foreign banana interests in this
economy. Ironically, the illegal payment in Honduras may well have
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proven to be a positive stimulant for change; the banana companies have
lost ownership of their railway and dock facilities, and concession
contracts which had been scarcely changed since the early 1900s have
been renegotiated. Substantial properties of the Standard Fruit opera-
tions have been taken over by the government, which will rehabilitate
those areas damaged by the hurricane.
Nicaragua
The prospects for economic growth in Nicaragua are significantly
dependent upon the resolution of the increasingly questionable stability
of the Somoza government. Considered, along with Honduras, by most
foreign investors as one of the least desirable locations for a plant
(partially because the capital city is at a climatically oppressive sea level),
Nicaragua possesses no known natural resources and only modest
prospects for attracting significant levels of tourism. Like Honduras, the
future prospects of significant economic growth must lie in regional
integration, and any important amounts of foreign investment will not
occur until there is a more predictable political stability than that which
currently exists.
Costa Rica
Costa Rica is viewed by potential foreign investors as the most
desirable Central American location in terms of political stability,
educational facilities and the general attractiveness of the San Jose area.
Such factors as the absence of a significant Indian population and a well-
established and increasingly stable middle class inject prospects for a
future stability to Costa Rica which are absent in all of the other nations
of the Central American isthmus. Costa Rica has had the most persistent
trade imbalance, caused partially by the demands of an increasingly
affluent middle class. This has led the country to a series of unilateral
actions designed to stabilize trade imbalances, actions which have been
in direct conflict with CACM rules and precepts. In each case, these
issues have been resolved through negotiation, a fact which illustrates
the potential for a peaceful resolution of intraregional disputes of an
economic nature. The position of Costa Rica is unique; it is a politically
stable island in a sea of political uncertainty, the only true democracy
functioning in Central America, and it possesses the most homogeneous
population of the area. The failure of the planned Alcoa bauxite project
was obviously a discouragmig occurrence. Costa Rica achieved a rapid
growth as a preferred industrial location during the early years of the
CACM. Restoration of the CACM is consequently important to continu-
ing its role as one of the leaders of that market. Lacking known producing
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natural resources, but nevertheless aware of the existence of low grade
bauxite with a potential for exploitation, Costa Rica does not currently
possess the leverage of Guatemala to suggest the dominance of
nationalism vis-A-vis the perceived benefits of regionalism.
PROSPECTS FOR THE CACM, PANAMA AND BELIZE
Discussed in some detail above, the CACM is not likely to achieve the
status hoped for in the proposed treaty, which calls for a significant
social and economic association beyond a restoration of the customs
union. There appear to be no critical pressures for the restoration of the
union and indeed there are a sufficient number of attention-diverting
activities, in the form of natural phenomena, such as the earthquakes in
Nicaragua and Guatemala and the hurricane in Honduras, the frequency
of elections, the development of petroleum and nickel in Guatemala and
the periodic dislocation caused by the foreign banana companies and
international coffee prices. The restoration of the CACM will continue to
be much discussed but have, in reality, a comparatively low priority. It
should not. This area of dependent nations is in need of the increased
leverage of an international trading area through the effective operation
of an economic union. None of the attention-diverting factors or trade-
retarding issues can be viewed as precluding the restoration of the
market. There is relatively little reason to believe, however, that such a
view is shared by a sufficient number of those in power throughout the
market to predict an early restoration.
With the basic problems of the role of the United States and Panama
nearing resolution, Panama will be able to continue more easily on its
economic path. It would appear quite clearly that the nation will increase
its role as an offshore banking center, attempting to focus on a service
role in the Americas, in contrast to a sole reliance upon competing with
other Latin American nations as the situs of productive foreign
investment. This should not suggest that Panama will not so compete,
since its central location in the hemisphere and transportation facilities
suggest a quite suitable location for such activities as assembly
industries. Tourism is and will continue to be an important contributor to
GDP, as will the important new Texasgulf copper project. Possessing the
most socialist-oriented government of the Central American nations (not
including Belize), one may also predict a greater likelihood of increasing
state control and participation in banana production, and less of an
ability of foreign investors to penetrate the government structures in
ways illustrated by the recent history in Honduras. Whether Panama will
seek an association in a restored CACM remains uncertain. It is at a
geographical disadvantage in terms of land transportation due to the
distance to major markets in El Salvador and Guatemala, but it could
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significantly benefit from an association with Costa Rica. It is somewhat
doubtful, nevertheless, that any early association will be forthcoming.
There will be a time delay while Panama considers its economic future
after the canal issue is resolved. There is likely to be a significant
concentration on the utilization of the canal and on the canal zone for
economic development in Panama in the near future. This is likely to
include the establishment of ship repair facilities and other ocean
transportation service-oriented projects. The potential for growth in this
area, plus the development of the copper resources, would appear to lessen
the need of Panama to commence any discussions for participation in
agreements other than bilateral arrangements with individual Central
American nations.
The future for Belize depends upon resolution of the territorial issue.
It appears quite clear that the population of Belize is determined to
achieve full independence. The critical issue is whether Guatemala will be
willing to recognize Belize to the extent perceived by the British who
would withdraw from providing foreign policy and security assistance. If,
or perhaps when, independence is achieved, it is doubtful that significant
trading relationships will be established with Guatemala. Belize is
additionally distant from the major markets of its other border neighbor,
Mexico. Add to this the cultural and political orientation to several of the
Caribbean nations and one must predict that Belize will seek its future
economic associations with Caribbean nations rather than with those of
the Central American isthmus.
